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It is widely accepted in clinical ethics that removing a patient from a
ventilator at the patient’s request is ethically permissible. This
constitutes voluntary passive euthanasia. However, voluntary active
euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the
intention of ending that patient’s life, is ethically proscribed, as is
assisted suicide, such as providing a patient with lethal pills or a
lethal infusion. Proponents of voluntary active euthanasia and
assisted suicide have argued that the distinction between killing and
letting die is flawed and that there is no real difference between
actively ending someone’s life and ‘‘merely’’ allowing them to die.
This paper shows that, although this view is correct, there is even less
of a distinction than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. It
does so by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately
reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations: if a patient is
mentally competent and wants to die, his body itself constitutes
unwarranted life support unfairly prolonging his or her mental life.
I
t is widely accepted in clinical ethics
that removing a patient from a venti-
lator at the patient’s request is ethically
permissible. This is often termed volun-
tary passive euthanasia (VPE), although
there is controversy over this terminology
and in particular over the idea that
ending a patient’s life in this way is any
less direct than other means.1 Conversely,
voluntary active euthanasia (VAE), such
as giving a patient a lethal overdose with
the intention of ending that patient’s life,
is ethically proscribed, as is assisted
suicide (AS), such as providing a patient
with lethal pills or a lethal infusion.
Proponents of VAE and AS have argued
that the distinction between killing and
letting die is flawed, and that there is no
real distinction between actively ending
someone’s life and ‘‘merely’’ allowing
them to die. This paper will argue that,
while this is correct, there is a more
powerful way of collapsing the distinction
between VAE and VPE. If we regard the
body of someone who requests VAE or AS
as providing unwarranted life support, it
is clear that there is no substantive moral
difference between turning off a ventila-
tor (for example) and providing or
administering a lethal drug.
TWO CASES
Let us begin by considering two similar
cases. In the first, Adam is dying of lung
cancer and is on a ventilator. He is in
constant pain and needs help eating,
drinking, washing and going to the toilet.
He regards his life as no longer worth
living and, with the consent of his family,
requests that the doctor disconnects the
ventilator. In the second case, Brian is
dying of stomach cancer. He is in con-
stant pain and needs help eating, drink-
ing, washing and going to the toilet,
although he can breathe easily. He
regards his life as no longer worth living
and, with the consent of his family,
requests the doctor to administer a
medication that will end his life.
Most doctors, assuming that they sub-
scribed to the dominant ethical view,
would grant Adam’s request and refuse
Brian’s (a recent survey showed that non-
treatment decisions (VPE) accounted for
30.3% of end-of-life decisions, with VAE
and AS accounting for only 0.16% and
0.00%, respectively).2 A common justifi-
cation for making this moral differentia-
tion is that, in the first case, the patient
has exercised his right to refuse treat-
ment; although granting this request will
cause the patient’s death, the doctor is
required to respect the patient’s decision.
In the second case, however, Brian has
made a request for VAE; in terms of the
current legality of granting the request,
the doctor would be quite sensible to
refuse it, even though this would mean
going against his patient’s wishes. Given
that Adam is competent, a doctor who
refused his request would be guilty of the
tort of trespass to the person.3
Now let us examine the moral features
of the situation more closely. Adam has
decided that he no longer wants to live; so
has Brian. Adam does not have anything
in particular against the ventilator itself;
he simply knows that it is keeping him
alive and wants it to stop doing so. Brian,
similarly, has nothing against his body
and merely wants it to stop keeping him
alive. As such, Brian’s body, like Adam’s
ventilator, is keeping him alive despite his
wishes to the contrary: it constitutes
unwarranted life support.
BRAIN DEATH AND BRAIN LIFE
The problem, for both Brian and the
doctor, is that this is not the traditionally
accepted way of looking at the situation.
The new perspective requires us to accept
that we as persons are not identical with
our bodies (for more on the mind/body
problem, see Robinson4). Although this
might sound counterintuitive to some, it
is clearly the accepted view in biomedical
ethics, given that the modern criterion of
death is brain death. If the definition of
the death of a person is brain death, it
follows that ‘‘we’’ as persons are not
identical with our bodies. If someone’s
brain stops working forever, we no longer
refer to him or her as a person; this must
mean that the body is, in a sense, a life-
support system for the person. While this
system could continue to function after
brain death as the body of a dead person,
the body is not the same thing as the
patient, and in this vital sense, Brian is
not his body; he is his mind. He would be
quite happy if there were some quantum
leap in stem cell technology and his brain
(with his mind intact) could be trans-
planted into a cancer-free new body
cultured from his DNA; this would be a
better way of ending his suffering than
dying. Although persons obviously have
feelings for their bodies that they do not
have for external equipment such as a
ventilator, such feelings lose all moral
power when a patient decides that his or
her body is now a burden. If we agree that
brain death is the end of a person, we
should adopt brain life as the central
aspect of personhood in terminal patients
and accept that the body is merely
another type of life support.
This in turn implies that the distinction
between artificial and natural (bodily)
means of life support is a false one. The
key point, as Beauchamp and Childress
say in arguing against the killing/letting
die distinction, is that ‘‘the forgoing of
the medical technology is validly author-
ized and for this reason justified … the
validity of the authorization, not some
independent assessment of causation,
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determines the morality of the action’’.5
Applying this reasoning to Brian’s situa-
tion, we can see that he clearly authorises
his death; he actively requests it. No
medical technology is involved in Brian’s
case, but what moral reason can there be
for differentiating between a ventilator
that keeps the brain working and a body
that keeps the brain working?
Adopting a different perspective,
Patrick Hopkins suggests regarding a
ventilator as part of a person: ‘‘when we
terminate the function of a person’s
pulmonary system, we have thereby
caused her inability to exchange neces-
sary gases. In doing so, we killed her.
Whether labelled artificial or natural it is
our disruption of her pulmonary system
that prevents her from getting air.’’1 This
approach collapses the distinction
between killing and letting die by viewing
the ventilator as an external lung. While
this is effective, the more important
perspective is that Brian’s lungs, like
Adam’s ventilator, are violating his
autonomy by prolonging his life against
his will. Adam is lucky inasmuch as he
has a right to refuse further treatment; in
Brian’s case, his mind’s desire is being
thwarted by his own body.
Although there may be a difference
between their situations in medical and
legal terms, this is the true moral status of
the situation: both Brian and Adam are
dying, are in pain, and are requesting the
deactivation of something that is keeping
them alive against their will. It might be
objected that the clear difference is that
the ventilator is an artificial device
attached to Adam only in the hospital,
whereas Brian has nothing to refuse in
this way; the doctors can legitimately
turn off the ventilator because they
connected it to Adam in the first place,
but the same is not true of Brian. This is
an obvious intuitive response, but it has
no power; what if Brian had been fitted
with artificial lungs as a baby? The first
human to be fitted with an artifical heart,
Barney Clark, was given an option most
of us don’t have: a key to turn it off. Dr
Willem Kolff, founder of the artificial
heart programme, said that ‘‘if the man
suffers and feels it isn’t worth it any
more, he has a key that he can apply … I
think it is entirely legitimate that this
man whose life has been extended should
have the right to cut it off if he doesn’t
want it, if [his] life ceases to be enjoy-
able.’’6 If we agree (as it seems we
should) that it is acceptable to turn off
Adam’s external ‘‘lungs’’, and Barney’s
internal artificial heart, why should we
penalise Brian for having an internal
natural heart and lungs? It might be
argued that Brian’s life, unlike Barney’s,
has not ‘‘been extended’’, because he can
carry on living without intervention. But
Brian’s life is extended in the essential
sense that its remainder is undignified
and painful, and he does not will its
continued extension. Beauchamp points
out the problem:
Medicine and law seem now to say to
many patients, ‘‘If you were on life-
sustaining treatment, you could with-
draw [permission for] the treatment
and we could let you die. But since
you are not, we can only give you
palliative care until you die a natural
death.’’ This position condemns the
patient to live out a life he or she does
not want—a form of cruelty that
violates the patient’s rights and pre-
vents discharge of the fiduciary obli-
gations of the physician.7
This cruelty is cast in even sharper light
when we consider that the body is, in
fact, life support for the brain and mind.
Viewed this way, the situation is reduced
to granting death to one patient on life
support but not the other.
BODIES, MINDS AND MORAL
DISTANCE
It is worth considering why some doctors
are intuitively opposed to VAE. Could it
not be that the remoteness of the
ventilator from the patient gives a sense
of moral distance from the act of ‘‘kill-
ing’’? The doctor has no qualms about
performing the action that will effectively
stop Adam breathing, but the fact that he
must actually do something to Brian’s body
to give him what he wants makes him
hesitate and refuse. In the same way that
killing someone from afar with a rifle is
likely to be less traumatic (for the killer)
than getting close and stabbing the
victim, moral queasiness at the more
direct intervention necessitated by a
request for AS or VAE makes doctors
tend to refuse such requests. This is a
more physical application of the killing/
letting die distinction. Hopkins points out
that, ‘‘if artificial lungs could be as
efficient and as internal as a pacemaker,
I suspect the notion that we could turn
them off with causal and moral impunity
would seem as odd as it really is’’.1
Hopkins’ point is not that doctors are
wrong to turn off ventilators when
requested, but that the intuitive distinc-
tion between VAE and VPE would dis-
appear if ventilators were an integral part
of patients’ bodies.
Of course, part of the problem is the
very close connection between the body
and brain: in a sense, it is even closer
than that between body and heart, as we
know that hearts can be replaced without
changing the person. This presents intui-
tive problems for doctors, who most of
the time are dealing with people who
want their brain activity to continue for
as long as possible. Such patients also
obviously want their bodies to keep
working, as their brains are dependent
upon these life-support systems. For
patients requesting AS and VAE, the
situation is inverted: they want their
brain activity to cease (assuming a new
body is not an option) and it is their
troublesome bodies that are causing the
problems. In this case, the appropriate
‘‘treatment’’ is one that stops the body
working so that the brain (and person)
will die. In refusing VAE and AS requests,
it is almost as if doctors are obeying the
‘‘wish’’ of the patient’s body rather than
the patient’s mind, as keeping bodies
functioning is what doctors are habitu-
ated to. This attitude is understandable,
but it is not ethical.
ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY
TREATMENT
Another way of looking at the problem is
via another supposed distinction: that
between ordinary and extraordinary
treatment. Some doctors argue that a
ventilator constitutes extraordinary treat-
ment and that discontinuing ventilation
is therefore acceptable, whereas ordinary
treatments such as food and water cannot
be discontinued. Quite apart from the
classification problems this approach
entails, given different definitions of
‘‘extraordinary’’, what use is this distinc-
tion when the patient’s desire is for all
treatment to cease? Adam wants his body
to stop keeping him alive, so his venti-
lator is unplugged; Brian, on the other
hand, has no such external ‘‘button’’ so
he must continue to suffer.
Nevertheless, supporters of the distinc-
tion between ordinary and extraordinary
treatment might say that if we accept that
the body, regarded as a life-support
system, is a sort of treatment for the
brain, it must be classified as an ordinary
treatment, because it requires no inter-
vention from staff. As such, they might
argue, it is not permissible to withhold
treatment, which in this case would mean
taking the necessary steps to cause death.
But once again, whether a treatment is
ordinary or extraordinary is not impor-
tant: from the point of view of the
patient’s mind and desires, a ventilator,
food and the body all have the same
status as life-prolonging burdens that
should be discontinued. Beauchamp and
Childress state that ‘‘the principal con-
sideration is whether a treatment is
beneficial or burdensome, not what its
classification is.’’5 I would go further and
say that whether it is a treatment or the
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patient’s body is not important: if the
body is a burden, it should be discon-
tinued, just like a burdensome treatment.
Beauchamp and Childress further state
that ‘‘no morally relevant difference
exists between the various life-sustaining
technologies’’ and ‘‘the right to refuse
medical treatment for oneself or others is
not contingent on the type of treatment’’.5
If we accept this, then opponents of my
argument must indicate what the moral
difference is between a treatment and
Brian’s body when either could be keep-
ing him alive against his will.
The British Medical Association’s
guideline End-of-life decisions states that
Medical treatment can legally and
ethically be withdrawn when it is futile
in that it cannot accomplish any
improvement, when it would not be
in the patient’s best interest to con-
tinue treatment (because, for exam-
ple, it is simply prolonging the dying
process) or when the patient has
refused further treatment.’’8
Adam’s case fulfils all three criteria (and,
given the phrasing, it appears that any
one would be sufficient). The ventilator
cannot improve his condition, it is simply
prolonging the process of dying and he
has refused further treatment. If we
accept that Brian’s lungs do constitute
unwarranted life support, in the sense
that his mind does not want his body to
keep it alive, then his case also fulfils all
three criteria: his lungs cannot improve
his condition, they are simply prolonging
the process of dying and he has refused
further treatment, at least in the sense
that he wants his lungs to stop working.
CONCLUSION
I have sketched the outline of a new
perspective for regarding cases of compe-
tent terminal patients who want to die. If
we accept this new perspective, it becomes
clear that there is no moral difference
between VAE and VPE, as both consist of
deactivating life support to the brain.
(Whether doctors have an obligation to
provide VAE or AS is another question, but
if there is really no moral difference
between VAE and VPE, it follows that
doctors have a duty either to perform both
or to perform neither.) Fundamentally, the
fact that Brian’s brain is ‘‘hard-wired’’ into
its support system makes not the slightest
moral difference, however counterintuitive
this may seem. Patients should not be
condemned to a slow death simply because
their systems of life support are natural
rather than artificial.
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